STATE OF FLORIDA
REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION

In the matter of:

Claimant/Appellant

R.A.A.C. Order No. 14-01582

vs.

Referee Decision No. 0021457495-02U

Employer/Appellee

ORDER OF REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION

This case comes before the Commission for disposition of an appeal of the decision of a reemployment assistance appeals referee pursuant to Section 443.151(4)(c), Florida Statutes. The referee's decision stated that a request for review should specify any and all allegations of error with respect to the referee's decision, and that allegations of error not specifically set forth in the request for review may be considered waived.

Upon appeal of an examiner's determination, a referee schedules a hearing. Parties are advised prior to the hearing that the hearing is their only opportunity to present all of their evidence in support of their case. The appeals referee has responsibility to develop the hearing record, weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and render a decision supported by competent, substantial evidence.

By law, the Commission's review is limited to those matters that were presented to the referee and are contained in the official record. A decision of an appeals referee cannot be overturned by the Commission if the referee's material findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence and the decision comports with the legal standards established by the Florida Legislature. Additionally, it is the responsibility of the appeals referee to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve conflicts in evidence, including testimonial evidence. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Commission cannot substitute its judgment and overturn a referee's conflict resolution.

Having considered all arguments raised on appeal and having reviewed the hearing record, the Commission concludes no legal basis exists to reopen or supplement the record by the acceptance of any additional evidence sent to the Commission or to remand the case for further proceedings.

The referee's findings of fact state as follows:

> The claimant was employed as an investigator for the employer, a state agency, from April 2010 until January 10, 2014. In 2010, the claimant opened an investigation into a family. It was reported that prior to the close of the investigation, the claimant took custody of a child of the family she was investigating, creating a conflict of interest. The claimant reported that she did not take custody of the child until after the investigation had been closed. After the investigation was closed in 2011, the claimant was told by the state agency that she was receiving a written reprimand for her conduct in the investigation and that she was to have no further contact with the child. After the write-up, the claimant began to care for the child and became the child's legal guardian. The claimant cared for the child on and off between 2011 and December 2013. In December 2013, the state agency opened a new, separate investigation into the family in question. The agency attempted to find the child in question, and discovered that the claimant had been caring for the child. When the child was found, the child was in the claimant's care and was calling the claimant "mother." The agency removed the child from the claimant's care. The employer decided to terminate the claimant's employment. The claimant was notified of the employer's decision on January 10, 2014, but the claimant's supervisor allowed the claimant to resign in lieu of discharge. The claimant resigned her employment on January 11, 2014.

Based on these findings, the referee held the claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with work.

Effective May 17, 2013, Section 443.036(30)(a), Florida Statutes, states that misconduct connected with work, "irrespective of whether the misconduct occurs at the workplace or during working hours, includes, but is not limited to, the following, which may not be construed in pari materia with each other":

> (a) Conduct demonstrating a conscious disregard of an employer's interests and found to be a deliberate violation or disregard of the reasonable standards of behavior which the employer expects of his or her employee. Such conduct may include, but is not limited to, willful damage to an employer's property that results in damage of more than $50; or theft of employer property or property of a customer or invitee of the employer.

Upon review of the record and the arguments on appeal, the Commission concludes the record adequately supports the referee's material findings and the referee's conclusion is a correct application of the pertinent laws to the material facts of the case. We write separately to address a number of issues raised by the claimant on appeal, or otherwise raised by the facts of this case, not specifically addressed by the referee.

In addition to the findings of fact made by the referee, it must be noted that the claimant did not dispute the testimony presented by the employer's program administrator that the claimant circumvented court procedures for child placement when she began personally caring for the child in question. The program administrator explained that, when a child is removed from his or her home, the employer is required to go to court and seek an appropriate placement. During the hearing the claimant admitted that in 2010 she was reprimanded and told to have no further contact with anyone in the child's family. She further testified that she became involved with the child through her duties as a pastor's wife because the family came to their ministry for aid, and they then discovered they were extended relations. She explained that the child stayed with her and her husband on and off, that they obtained power of attorney to take the child to the doctor and to receive the child's food stamps, and that her supervisor and others at the employer were aware she was residing with the child. The employer's child protective supervisor testified that at the time of the last investigation the child was calling the claimant "mother," and the claimant admitted to her that the child had resided in her home from 2011 until the state reclaimed custody of the child from her in January 2014.

Whether the child resided with the claimant continuously or sporadically, the record reflects that the claimant had contact with the child after warning, that the child spent periods of time in the claimant's home, and that the claimant was discharged because of her personal relationship with a child whose family she had previously investigated. Individuals who act in contravention of prior warnings are generally disqualified from benefits. *Silver Springs v. Fla. Dep't of Commerce*, 366 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). *See also Orange Bank v. Unemployment Appeals Commission*, 611 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); *Caputo v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n*, 493 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (disqualifying a principal from benefits when he failed to heed his superintendent's directive to "cease and desist certain religious activities").

The claimant attempts to rebut the employer's prima facie case of misconduct by contending that her supervisor was aware she was involved with the child after warning. The employer's program administrator testified that the claimant took the child into her home, circumventing appropriate court procedures. While the claimant obtained a power of attorney from the child's mother, she was presumably aware of the provisions of the Florida Statutes that pertain to the surrender and placement of children and the legal provisions that aim to help maintain parents in their role as primary caregivers for their children. The supervisor's overlooking the claimant's willful violation of an agency warning, circumvention of court procedures, and possible violation of applicable statutes, of which they both should have been aware, does not exonerate the claimant's actions.

On appeal, the claimant also argues that the appeals referee's application of Section 443.036(30), Florida Statutes, to disqualify her from the receipt of benefits for violating the terms of a warning issued by her employer impermissibly infringed on her First Amendment right of association.

As a general rule, administrative agencies do not have jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims. However, exceptions to the rule have been recognized. First, "where an as-applied challenge to a rule is raised, courts have held that an individual must exhaust administrative remedies." *Sarnoff v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles*, 825 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2002). Tacit in a requirement that a party exhaust administrative remedies is an acknowledgment that the agency must address a party's constitutional challenge to how the rule is being applied. Second, the First District Court of Appeal has expressly noted that "[c]onstitutional questions arise not infrequently in administrative adjudication" and stated that

"[a]dministrative law judges not purporting to invalidate legislative enactments do not usurp judicial or legislative prerogatives by deciding — in the first instance — the constitutional issues that arise in cases properly before them." *Communications Workers of American, Local 3170 v. City of Gainvesville*, 697 So. 2d 167, 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

Because we are an independent commission addressing an as-applied constitutional challenge to administrative action, there is a strong argument that jurisdiction vests in the Commission to address this issue at this time. While our ability to make a legally binding resolution is not certain, the constitutional arguments must be addressed in order for the administrative proceeding to be fully resolved. Consequently, the Commission's reasoning regarding the claimant's constitutional challenges is set forth below. The claimant is a public employee. As such, her First Amendment rights can permissibly be limited by her employer. When a public employee alleges an adverse action has been taken against her for exercising a right protected by the First Amendment, courts employ the balancing test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Pickering v. Board of Education Township High School District 205, Will County*, 391 U.S. 563, 567, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734-35 (1968), which weighs the constitutional interest of the public employee and "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." As an adverse job action clearly occurred in this case, it was the claimant's burden to establish that she had a constitutional interest which was unduly impinged.

The claimant first asserts that her First Amendment rights were violated because the child is extended family. In *Moore v. City of East Cleveland*, 431 U.S. 494, 505, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938-39 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a right of extended relatives to cohabitate. Neither during the appeals hearing nor in her brief has the claimant specifically alleged how she is related to the child in question. She has not alleged that either she or her husband are the child's biological parent, grandparent, sibling, aunt, uncle, or cousin. The facts, as presented by the claimant, do not indicate a relationship with the degree of kinship that would require constitutional protection.

Assuming that the relationship is of the degree of kinship requiring constitutional protection, "the right of familial association is not absolute and may be outweighed by a legitimate government interest." *Buccini v. State of Fla. Dept' of Children & Family Services*, No. 2:08-cv-698-FtM-29DNF, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118311 (M.D. Fla. December 18, 2009). In *Ross v. Clayton County, Georgia*, 173 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit held that a "County's interests in internal efficiency and in employing correctional officers who act with discretion, good judgment, and in a manner that does not conflict with other correctional

officers or law enforcement officers" outweighed the employee's associational rights to cohabitate with his brother. *Id*. at 1310. The court found the employer had a special need to employ persons who act with good judgment and avoid potential conflicts of interest and held "there was no violation" of the employee's First Amendment rights. *Id*. at 1311. The Eleventh Circuit has also upheld an adverse employment action taken as a result of whom the employee has married. *McCabe v. Sharrett*, 12 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1994). *McCabe* is particularly noteworthy because the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the case under three different tests: the *Pickering* balancing test, the factors established in *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S. Ct. 2673[1] (1976), and strict scrutiny. The court noted "the government's interest in the efficient and effective performance of government functions is compelling." An employer who has taken an adverse job action as a result of an employee's familial association need not show that any disruptive events have actually occurred as a result of the association. *Ross*, 173 F.3d at 1311. In this case, the claimant was specifically warned not to have interaction with this child. She was not warned to stay away from other children or to neither foster nor adopt children. Rather, the employer had an express interest in ensuring the claimant did not privately engage with children who were part of open investigations or whose families had been investigated. The public employer in this case had numerous explicit and implicit interests: 1) ensuring that directives are obeyed; 2) ensuring that the impartiality of child protective investigators could not be questioned by the public; and 3) ensuring that when children are removed or surrendered, the procedures outlined in Florida Law, particularly in Florida Statutes Chapters 39 and 63, are adhered to fully.

The second and third interests above are particularly compelling. We do not doubt that the claimant was motivated by compassion and the desire to see that a child was properly cared for, but to a member of the public, her actions could be perceived, fairly or unfairly, as exploiting her position with the state to obtain access to a child. The employer's responsibilities in child protection are challenging, to say the least, and their actions in removing children from their homes, even when abundant cause is shown to do so, are inherently controversial. The employer has every reason to prohibit behavior from its employees that could even *appear* to constitute a conflict of interest. Nor do we agree with any contention by the claimant that no apparent conflict of interest existed after the investigation was over.

[1] The *Elrod* test is not applicable to this case because it addresses adverse employment action taken based upon political affiliation.

To ensure the due process of all parties involved, child protection investigations, custody proceedings, and adoption proceedings are all governed by statutory requirements. The employer's interest in ensuring that statutory mandates are complied with, and that due process is provided to all potentially interested parties, is clearly a compelling governmental interest, and one that the claimant's behavior in this case circumvented, or at least appeared to do so.

To the extent that the claimant has a First Amendment right to associate with this child as an extended family member, the claimant's interest in this case is outweighed by the employer's compelling interests noted above. Not only do the *Pickering* factors balance strongly in the employer's favor, but we conclude that the employer's action survives even strict scrutiny analysis.[2]

The claimant also asserts her freedom of religious association was infringed because the child was brought to the church where her husband was pastor and she interacted with the child as part of her duties as the pastor's wife. Her testimony does not indicate, however, why it was necessary for the child to be kept in her home, rather than the home of another individual, as part of that religious association. To the extent that the claimant was engaged in bona fide religious association, we apply the same analysis, and reach the same result, as we did for her familial association contention.

We note that the claimant does not raise a First Amendment Free Exercise contention in her brief. Given that the claimant has failed to identify a specific religious belief or practice that required her to take this particular child into her home, such a claim would be difficult at best to raise. Accordingly, we do not fully analyze whether disqualification in this case would be permissible under the doctrines established in *Employment Division v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); *Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security*, 489 U.S. 829 (1989); *Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida*, 480 U.S. 136, 107, S. Ct. 1046 (1987); *Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security*, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981); and *Sherbert v. Verner*, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963). We note, however, under that line of precedent, disqualification would be permissible if the state could identify compelling interests justifying the disqualification. As noted above, we believe such interests exist in this case.

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[2] We recognize that the issue of whether the employer had good cause to discharge the claimant notwithstanding any associative rights is a separate issue from whether the claimant's associative rights preclude disqualification from receipt of benefits. Because we find the employer's discharge of the claimant was consistent with a strict scrutiny analysis, we conclude, consistent with the analysis below, that disqualification is not precluded by her associative rights.

For the aforementioned reasons, the claimant must be disqualified from the receipt of benefits and her disqualification does not impermissibly infringe upon her First Amendment rights of association.

The Commission notes that the claimant's Notice of Appeal was filed by a representative for the claimant. Section 443.041, Florida Statutes, provides that a representative for any individual claiming benefits in any proceeding before the Commission shall not receive a fee for such services unless the amount of the fee is approved by the Commission. The claimant's representative shall provide the amount, if any, the claimant has agreed to pay for services, the hourly rate charged or other method used to compute the proposed fee, and the nature and extent of the services rendered, not later than fifteen (15) days from the date of this Order.

The referee's decision is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION

Frank E. Brown, Chairman
Thomas D. Epsky, Member
Joseph D. Finnegan, Member

This is to certify that on

10/2/2014 ,

the above Order was filed in the office of the Clerk of the Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission, and a copy mailed to the last known address of each interested party.

By: Kimberley Pena
Deputy Clerk

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
PO BOX 5250
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32314 5250

*24725855 *

Docket No.0021 4574 95-02 Jurisdiction: §443.151(4)(a)&(b) Florida Statutes

CLAIMANT/Appellant ***EMPLOYER/Appellee***

APPEARANCES Employer

Claimant

DECISION OF APPEALS REFEREE

Important appeal rights are explained at the end of this decision.

Derechos de apelación importantes son explicados al final de esta decisión.

Yo eksplike kèk dwa dapèl enpòtan lan fen desizyon sa a.

Issues Involved: SEPARATION: Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with work or voluntarily left work without good cause as defined in the statute, pursuant to Sections 443.101(1), (9), (10), (11); 443.036(30), Florida Statutes; Rule 73B-11.020, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings of Fact: The claimant was employed as an investigator for the employer, a state agency, from April 2010 until January 10, 2014. In 2010, the claimant opened an investigation into a family. It was reported that prior to the close of the investigation, the claimant took custody of a child of the family she was investigating, creating a conflict of interest. The claimant reported that she did

not take custody of the child until after the investigation had been closed. After the investigation was closed in 2011, the claimant was told by the state agency that she was receiving a written reprimand for her conduct in the investigation and that she was to have no further contact with the child. After the write-up, the claimant began to care for the child and became the child's legal guardian. The claimant cared for the child on and off between 2011 and December 2013. In December 2013, the state agency opened a new, separate investigation into the family in question. The agency attempted to find the child in question, and discovered that the claimant had been caring for the child. When the child was found, the child was in the claimant's care and was calling the claimant "mother." The agency removed the child from the claimant's care. The employer decided to terminate the claimant's employment. The claimant was notified of the employer's decision on January 10, 2014, but the claimant's supervisor allowed the claimant to resign her employment in lieu of discharge. The claimant resigned her employment on January 11, 2014.

Conclusions of Law: As of May 17, 2013, the Reemployment Assistance Law of Florida defines misconduct connected with work as, but is not limited to, the following, which may not be construed in pari materia with each other:

a. Conduct demonstrating conscious disregard of an employer's interests and found to be a deliberate violation or disregard of the reasonable standards of behavior which the employer expects of his or her employee. Such conduct may include, but is not limited to, willful damage to an employer's property that results in damage of more than $50; theft of employer property or property of a customer or invitee of the employer.

b. Carelessness or negligence to a degree or recurrence that manifests culpability, or wrongful intent, or shows an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to his or her employer.

c. Chronic absenteeism or tardiness in deliberate violation of a known policy of the employer or one or more unapproved absences following a written reprimand or warning relating to more than one unapproved absence.

d. A willful and deliberate violation of a standard or regulation of this state by an employee of an employer licensed or certified by this state, which violation would cause the employer to be sanctioned or have its license or certification suspended by this state.

e. 1. A violation of an employer's rule, unless the claimant can demonstrate that:

a. He or she did not know, and could not reasonably know, of the rule's requirements;

b The rule is not lawful or not reasonably related to the job environment and performance; or

c. The rule is not fairly or consistently enforced.

2. Such conduct may include, but is not limited to, committing criminal assault or battery on another employee, or on a customer or invitee of the employer; or committing abuse or neglect of a patient, resident, disabled person, elderly person, or child in her or his professional care.

The record reflects that the claimant was discharged for caring for a child that the claimant was instructed to have no interaction with two years prior. While the claimant was offered the option to resign in lieu of discharge, the employer was the moving party in the job separation when the employer asked the claimant to resign on January 10, 2014. The claimant, after discovering the true identity of the child in question a year and a half prior to her discharge, continued to care for the child, even taking power of attorney over the child and became its legal guardian. This was after the claimant was admonished by her employer to have no further contact with the child, after the claimant had reportedly taken custody of the child while the claimant was investigating the child's family. Whether or not this actually occurred, the claimant was clearly instructed to never have contact with the child again. The claimant's actions, while possibly well-intentioned, demonstrated "conscious disregard of an employer's interests and found to be a deliberate violation or disregard of the reasonable standards of behavior which the employer expects of his or her employee." Accordingly, the claimant is reasoned to have been terminated for misconduct connected with work, and is disqualified for the receipt of benefits.

Decision: The determination dated February 12, 2014 is AFFIRMED. The claimant is disqualified for the receipt of benefits from January 5, 2014, and for the five following weeks, and until the claimant earns $4,675.

If this decision disqualifies and/or holds the claimant ineligible for benefits already received, the claimant will be required to repay those benefits. The specific amount of any overpayment will be calculated by the department and set forth in a separate overpayment determination, unless specified in this decision. However, the time to request review of this decision is as shown above and is not stopped, delayed or extended by any other determination, decision or order.

This is to certify that a copy of the above decision was distributed to the last known address of each interested party on March 18, 2014

JOHN CARPENTER
Appeals Referee

By: 

ANTONIA SPIVEY (WATSON), Deputy Clerk

IMPORTANT - APPEAL RIGHTS: This decision will become final unless a written request for review or reopening is filed within 20 calendar days after the mailing date shown. If the 20th day is a Saturday, Sunday or holiday defined in F.A.C. 73B-21.004, filing may be made on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or holiday. If this decision disqualifies and/or holds the claimant ineligible for benefits already received, the claimant will be required to repay those benefits. The specific amount of any overpayment will be calculated by the Department and set forth in a separate overpayment determination. However, the time to request review of this decision is as shown above and is not stopped, delayed or extended by any other determination, decision or order.

A party who did not attend the hearing for good cause may request reopening, including the reason for not attending, at connect.myflorida.com or by writing to the address at the top of this decision. The date of the confirmation page will be the filing date of a request for reopening on the Department's Web Site.

A party who attended the hearing and received an adverse decision may file a request for review to the Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission, Suite 101 Rhyne Building, 2740 Centerview Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4151; (Fax: 850-488-2123); **https://raaciap.floridajobs.org.** If mailed, the postmark date will be the filing date. If faxed, hand-delivered, delivered by courier service other than the United States Postal Service, or submitted via the Internet, the date of receipt will be the filing date. To avoid delay, include the docket number and claimant's social security number. A party requesting review should specify any and all allegations of error with respect to the referee's decision, and provide factual and/or legal support for these challenges. Allegations of error not specifically set forth in the request for review may be considered waived.

IMPORTANTE - DERECHOS DE APELACIÓN: Esta decisión pasará a ser final a menos que una solicitud por escrito para revisión o reapertura se registre dentro de 20 días de calendario después de la fecha marcada en que la decisión fue remitida por correo. Si el vigésimo (20) día es un sábado, un domingo o un feriado definidos en F.A.C. 73B-21.004, el registro de la solicitud se puede realizar en el día siguiente que no sea un sábado, un domingo o un feriado. Si esta decisión descalifica y/o declara al reclamante como inelegible para recibir beneficios que ya fueron recibidos por el reclamante, se le requerirá al reclamante rembolsar esos beneficios. La cantidad específica de cualquier sobrepago [*pago excesivo de beneficios*] será calculada por la Agencia y establecida en una determinación de pago excesivo de beneficios que será emitida por separado. Sin embargo, el límite de tiempo para solicitar la revisión de esta decisión es como se establece anteriormente y dicho límite no es detenido, demorado o extendido por ninguna otra determinación, decisión u orden.

Una parte que no asistió a la audiencia por una buena causa puede solicitar una reapertura, incluyendo la razón por no haber comparecido en la audiencia, en connect.myflorida.com o escribiendo a la dirección en la parte superior de esta decisión. La fecha de la página de confirmación será la fecha de presentación de una solicitud de reapertura en la página de Internet del Departamento.

Una parte que asistió a la audiencia y recibió una decisión adversa puede registrar una solicitud de revisión con la Comisión de Apelaciones de Servicios de Reempleo; Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission, Suite 101 Rhyne Building, 2740 Centerview Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4151; (Fax: 850-488-2123); **https://raaciap.floridajobs.org.** Si la solicitud es enviada por correo, la fecha del sello de la oficina de correos será la fecha de registro de la solicitud. Si es enviada por telefax, entregada a mano, entregada por servicio de mensajería, con la excepción del Servicio Postal de Estados Unidos, o realizada vía el Internet, la fecha en la que se recibe la solicitud será la fecha de registro. Para evitar demora, incluya el número de expediente [*docket number*] y el número de seguro social del reclamante. Una parte que solicita una revisión debe especificar cualquiera y todos los alegatos de error con respecto a la decisión del árbitro, y proporcionar fundamentos reales y/o legales para substanciar éstos desafíos. Los alegatos de error que no se establezcan con especificidad en la solicitud de revisión pueden considerarse como renunciados.

ENPÒTAN - DWA DAPÈL: Desizyon sa a ap definitif sòf si ou depoze yon apèl nan yon delè 20 jou apre dat nou poste sa a ba ou. Si 20^{yèm} jou a se yon samdi, yon dimanch oswa yon jou konje, jan sa defini lan F.A.C. 73B-21.004, depo an kapab fèt jou aprè a, si se pa yon samdi, yon dimanch oswa yon jou konje. Si desizyon an diskalifye epi/oswa deklare moun k ap fè demann lan pa kalifye pou alokasyon li resevwa deja, moun k ap fè demann lan ap gen pou li remèt lajan li te resevwa a. Se Ajans lan k ap kalkile montan nenpòt ki peman anplis epi y ap detèmine sa lan yon desizyon separe. Sepandan, delè pou mande revizyon desizyon sa a se delè yo bay anwo a; Okenn lòt detèminasyon, desizyon oswa lòd pa ka rete, retade oubyen pwolonje dat sa a.

Yon pati ki te gen yon rezon valab pou li pat asiste seyans lan gen dwa mande pou yo ouvri ka a ankò; fòk yo bay rezon yo pat ka vini an epi fè demann nan sou sitwèb sa a, connect.myflorida.com oswa alekri nan adrès ki mansyone okomansman desizyon sa a. Dat cofimasyon page sa pral jou ou ranpli deman pou reouvewti dan web sit depatman.

Yon pati ki te asiste odyans la epi li resevwa yon desizyon negatif kapab soumèt yon demann pou revizyon retounen travay Asistans Komisyon Apèl la, Suite 101 Rhyne Building, 2740 Centerview Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4151; (Faks: 850-488-2123); https://raaciap.floridajobs.org. Si poste a, dat tenm ap dat li ranpli aplikasyon. Si fakse, men yo-a delivre, lage pa sèvis mesaje lòt pase Etazini Sèvis nan Etazini Nimewo, oswa soumèt sou Entènèt la, dat yo te resevwa ap dat li ranpli aplikasyon. Pou evite reta, mete nimewo rejis la ak nimewo sosyal demandè a sekirite. Yon pati pou mande revizyon ta dwe presize nenpòt ak tout akizasyon nan erè ki gen rapò ak desizyon abit la, yo epi bay sipò reyèl ak / oswa legal pou defi sa yo. Alegasyon sou erè pa espesyalman tabli nan demann nan pou revizyon yo kapab konsidere yo egzante.
