

STATE OF FLORIDA
REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION

In the matter of:

Claimant/Appellant

R.A.A.C. Order No. 13-05720

vs.

Referee Decision No. 13-39025U

Employer/Appellee

ORDER OF REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION

This case comes before the Commission for disposition of the claimant's appeal pursuant to Section 443.151(4)(c), Florida Statutes, of a referee's decision wherein the claimant was held disqualified from receipt of benefits and the employer's account was noncharged.

Pursuant to the appeal filed in this case, the Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission has conducted a complete review of the evidentiary hearing record and decision of the appeals referee. *See* §443.151(4)(c), Fla. Stat. By law, the Commission's review is limited to those matters that were presented to the referee and are contained in the official record.

Procedural error requires this case to be remanded for further proceedings; accordingly, the Commission does not now address the issue of whether the claimant should be disqualified as provided in Section 443.101(1), Florida Statutes.

The referee's findings of fact state as follows:

The claimant worked for the employer as a charge entry poster from March 26, 2007 to February 1, 2013. The employer's policy provides that employees are prohibited from accessing their own medical records and medical records of family members unless they are accessing the records in connection with regular business purposes. The claimant was aware of the employer's policy. The claimant admittedly accessed her own and her son's medical information. There were a few times she accessed the information to perform charge entries as part of her job. However, many of the

times she accessed the files, no work was performed in connection with such access. The employer discharged the claimant for violation of the policy. The employer has discharged other employees in the past for the same type of policy violation.

Based on these findings, the referee held the claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with work. Upon review of the record and the arguments on appeal, the Commission concludes the record was not adequately developed with respect to several issues. Consequently, the referee's decision is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for additional proceedings.

Section 443.036(30), Florida Statutes, states that misconduct connected with work, "irrespective of whether the misconduct occurs at the workplace or during working hours, includes, but is not limited to, the following, which may not be construed in *pari materia* with each other":

- (a) Conduct demonstrating a conscious disregard of an employer's interests and found to be a deliberate violation or disregard of the reasonable standards of behavior which the employer expects of his or her employee.
- (b) Carelessness or negligence to a degree or recurrence that manifests culpability or wrongful intent, or shows an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his or her employer.
- (c) Chronic absenteeism or tardiness in deliberate violation of a known policy of the employer or one or more unapproved absences following a written reprimand or warning relating to more than one unapproved absence.
- (d) A willful and deliberate violation of a standard or regulation of this state by an employee of an employer licensed or certified by this state, which violation would cause the employer to be sanctioned or have its license or certification suspended by this state.

(e) A violation of an employer's rule, unless the claimant can demonstrate that:

1. He or she did not know, and could not reasonably know, of the rule's requirements;
2. The rule is not lawful or not reasonably related to the job environment and performance; or
3. The rule is not fairly or consistently enforced.

The record reflects the claimant was employed as a charge entry poster in the billing and insurance department of a medical clinic. The employer required its employees to review, sign and abide by a "Workforce Confidentiality Agreement," [Exh. 1 pp. 22-23] adopted in furtherance of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), as well as other federal and state laws regarding confidentiality of patient medical information. One provision of that document required employees to agree that they "will not access or view any information other than what is required to perform my job." Another provision required that employees agree that they "will not make any unauthorized transmissions, copies, disclosures, inquiries, modifications, or purging of Patient Information or Confidential Information." The claimant received and signed this document on March 26, 2007.

Apparently in response to incidents involving other employees, the employer sent an email and memorandum to all employees on April 21, 2011 regarding its HIPAA and Confidentiality Policy. [Exh. 1 pp. 16-17, 18-19] The claimant received and signed the memorandum on April 25, 2011. While much of the memorandum reminds the employees of the Workforce Confidentiality Agreement, the memorandum also provided additional examples of circumstances in which an employee was prohibited from accessing the clinic's electronic medical records (the Nextgen system). In particular, paragraphs number four and five are relevant to this case:

4. I wanted to view my records or my family member's records. NOT ALLOWED. You must contact your medical provider's office for this information. Please remember, you are NOT ALLOWED to even view your own medical record. This is a violation and against the Clinic's rules. You must contact your medical provider's office for this information.

5. I am the HIPAA contact for my family member and I simply wanted to view their records. NOT ALLOWED. You must contact the family member's medical provider for this information.

The employer's witnesses, the human resources director and the manager of the billing and insurance department, testified the claimant accessed her own and her son's medical charts on multiple occasions when she did not post any charge entries or perform any other work-related function. The claimant acknowledged she accessed her own and her son's medical charts, but only in connection with posting charge entries which was her job function. The referee found the claimant had accessed her own and her son's medical charts on numerous occasions when "no work was performed in connection with such access," which appears, based on statements in the referee's conclusions, to be a finding that the claimant intentionally accessed her and her son's records for non-work reasons. While there was competent, substantial evidence supporting this finding by the referee, this finding is incomplete with respect to the issues in this case, as will be discussed below.

Based on the finding that the claimant accessed medical records for non-work reasons, the referee concluded that the claimant had violated the employer's clearly established policy. The referee also concluded that the claimant failed to prove that she did not know the policy, that the policy was not lawful or reasonably related to the job environment and performance, or that it is not fairly and consistently enforced. However, the referee did not sufficiently develop the record regarding the issue of notice to the claimant that the employer's policy prohibited her from viewing her and her son's medical records, and further did not sufficiently develop the record as to the specific business purpose of the employer's policy as regards the claimant's viewing of her own and her son's medical records.

Additionally, there was evidence offered by the employer that the claimant accessed the medical records of a number of individuals with her last name. When questioned by the referee, she stated that these individuals might be family members, because she did not know everyone she was related to. However, the referee did not make any specific finding as to whether the claimant had accessed these individuals' records without being required to do so by her job. This omission is significant because, as will be seen below, the record is unclear as to whether the claimant's accessing of her and her son's records is misconduct under subparagraph (e). By contrast, if the claimant accessed the medical records of individuals other than herself or her dependents for other than work-related reasons, she has violated both the employer's policy and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, and is subject to disqualification under subsections (a) and (e) of the definition of misconduct. While the employer introduced several pages of records numbered 2-16 showing chart access for numerous individuals with [the claimant's last name], the employer did not specify, nor do the records clearly indicate, which, if any, of these entries indicate non-authorized access or modifications. On remand, the referee is directed to further develop the record to determine whether the

employer contends any of these instances were clearly not work-related, to question the employer's witnesses regarding how the documents prove that the access was not work-related, and to question the claimant further as to the purpose for these accesses. The referee is then directed to make specific findings as to whether the employer has proven that the claimant accessed any of these individuals' records for purposes not authorized by the employer. If the referee does find that any improper access was made, the referee is directed to reflect those findings and the relevant conclusions in her new decision.

With respect to the referee's findings regarding the claimant's accessing of her and her son's records on occasions when no work was performed, the Commission notes that, if the referee intended these findings to mean the accesses were not authorized, as is suggested by the referee's conclusions, the referee should make this finding specifically.

A violation of an employer's rule will not constitute misconduct under subparagraph (e) if the claimant did not know, nor could she have reasonably known, of the rule's prohibitions. While the claimant received the Workplace Confidentiality Agreement on March 26, 2007, she did not receive the April 21, 2011 memorandum until April 25, 2011. The Workforce Confidentiality Agreement did prohibit the claimant from accessing or viewing information other than as necessary to perform her job, but it did so in the context of the document which indicated its purpose was to "maintain patient privacy, including obligations to protect the confidentiality of patient information and to safeguard the privacy of patient information." Notwithstanding the strict wording of the document, an employee could reasonably have concluded that the agreement was not intended to apply to an employee's viewing of their own medical records. This fact is borne out by the employer's subsequent need to provide clarification to its employees that the policy precluded employees from accessing *their own information*. Thus, an issue exists as to whether, prior to April 25, 2011, the claimant knew or should have known that accessing her own or her family's records for non-work reasons was a violation of the employer's policy. We note that a significant number of the access instances identified in the employer's document occurred prior to April 25, 2011. On remand, the referee should inquire as to the reason(s) the employer felt the April 21, 2011 notice to employees was necessary, and the events that triggered that notice. The referee should then develop the record as to whether the claimant knew or reasonably should have known prior to April 25, 2011, that accessing her

own and her son's records was necessarily prohibited by the employer's Workforce Confidentiality Agreement. If the referee concludes that the claimant did not know, and should not have reasonably known prior to that date that accessing her own and her son's records was intended to be included within the prohibition of the Workforce Confidentiality Agreement, the referee must make specific findings as to the dates of access after April 25, 2011, that violated the employer's policy. In order for misconduct to be established under subparagraph (e), the policy at issue must be "lawful" and "reasonably related to the job environment." During the hearing, the employer contended its policy was designed to prevent the unlawful disclosure of protected medical information in compliance with HIPAA.

It is *unquestionable* that, *as a general rule*, a medical provider's policy limiting its employees' access to medical records to legitimate business purposes established by the employer is lawful and reasonably related to the job environment. Indeed, medical practitioners are required by laws such as the HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 C.F.R. Part 164, Subpart E), the HIPAA Security Rule (45 C.F.R. Part 164, Subpart C), Florida law (§456.057(7), Fla. Stat.), and other federal and state laws to maintain the confidentiality of patient medical information. Furthermore, the protection of patient privacy and the confidentiality of patient medical information is a foremost value of medical ethics. Nothing in our order today should suggest otherwise, and the Commission has on several occasions affirmed the denial of benefits due to employee misconduct in violating medical employer confidentiality policies. *See, e.g.*, R.A.A.C. Order No. 13-05326 (August 6, 2013). There is no question that the *general* application of the Workforce Confidentiality Agreement as well as the April 25, 2011 memorandum is consistent with the employer's legal obligations and rights. Our analysis in this case solely involves paragraphs 4 and 5 as quoted above, as they apply to an employee-patient's accessing of her own and her dependent's medical records.

The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not, with some limited exceptions, restrict an individual from access to medical information that is the individual's own medical information or the medical information of a family member over whom the individual is *in loco parentis*, such as the individual's minor child. To the contrary, the HIPAA Privacy Rule mandates that a healthcare provider *grant* access subject to certain exceptions:

- (a) Standard: Access to protected health information—(1) Right of access. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (a)(2) or (a)(3) of this section, an individual has a right of access to inspect and obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual in a designated record set, for as long as the protected health information is maintained in the designated record set, except for:

- (i) Psychotherapy notes;
- (ii) Information compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or for use in, a civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding; and
- (iii) Protected health information maintained by a covered entity that is:
 - (A) Subject to the Clinical Laboratory Improvements Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 263a, to the extent the provision of access to the individual would be prohibited by law; or
 - (B) Exempt from the Clinical Laboratory Improvements Amendments of 1988, pursuant to 42 CFR 493.3(a)(2).

45 C.F.R. §164.524. Subsections (a)(2)–(4) of the rule provide specific exceptions to the requirement of access. Subsections (b) and (c) of the rule provide guidelines as to the manner in which access must be provided, and the employer’s limited discretion to establish procedures for how access will be provided. The employer’s memorandum of April 21, 2011, provided some guidance, and the referee developed the record to some extent as to the proper manner under the clinic’s policies for the claimant to access her own and her son’s medical records. On remand, the referee should make specific findings as to whether the employer had adopted specific policies for providing access to the claimant’s and her son’s medical records, and whether the claimant had been advised of the same.

Since the April 21 memorandum, as applicable to the claimant’s accessing of her own and her son’s medical records, is not on its face designed to ensure compliance with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, it is unclear from the record what the specific business purpose of the employer’s policy is and how the employer’s policy is related to the job environment or the claimant’s employment. The fact that a claimant has a right of access to her own medical records does not mean that she can directly access them at any time and manner she wishes, but the employer did not provide a specific reason, when questioned, as to why access was prohibited *pursuant to the Privacy Rule*, which was the employer’s *stated* justification for the policy.

Instead, the employer offered a reason that could be consistent with another obligation under HIPAA. The employer's witness testified [at 17:50 and following] that the employer prohibited employees from accessing their own files for any reason, including work-related reasons, because the employer did not want any manipulation of the employer's medical or billing records by an employee-patient. This testimony suggests that the employer's policy as to such access may actually be intended to comply with the HIPAA Security Rule.¹ For example, one of the Security Rule's technical standards requires that a medical practice protect the integrity of its electronic records by "implement[ing] policies and procedures to protect electronic protected health information from improper alteration or destruction." 45 C.F.R. §164.312(c)(1). Thus, a medical practice can limit the direct access of employees to their own records to ensure the integrity of such medical records. We note, however, that the employer's witness' testimony that the employees were not allowed to access their own records even for work-related reasons is not borne out by the written policy documents introduced into the record, including, in particular, the April 25, 2011 memorandum. It would seem logical that if the employer did adopt such a rule, it would have been discussed in the April 21 memorandum. Additionally, the employer's witness testified that the employer's audit of the claimant's access of her own and her son's records reflected that she viewed, but did not modify, the medical records. While an improper modification of a medical or billing record is a clear violation of the Security Rule and employer policy, the referee must determine if the employer considers it necessary to prohibit read-only access as part of its data integrity policy, and if so, provide an explanation for that prohibition.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision is vacated and the case is remanded for the referee to convene a supplemental hearing, develop the record as outlined herein, and render a new decision featuring an appropriate credibility determination, if necessary, that is based upon the supplemented record. The development of the record should include: (1) developing the record as to whether the claimant accessed the records of individuals with her surname (other than herself) for unauthorized purposes; (2) clarifying the finding as to whether the claimant accessed her or her son's medical records for non-work-related purposes, and in particular, any such instances that she did so after April 25, 2011; (3) developing the record as to why the employer's policy prohibited employees from accessing their own medical records, whether such prohibition applied to both work-related access and personal access or merely personal access, the specific regulatory justification for such a prohibition, the manner in which employees were authorized

¹ The Commission notes that the employer's policy documents contained numerous provisions that were likely adopted pursuant to the Security Rule.

to obtain their or their dependents' medical records, and whether the claimant was advised of the proper means of access; and (4) if the employer prohibited employees from accessing their own medical records due to an integrity policy, whether and why the policy applied to access for both viewing records and for modifying them. The referee must then make appropriate findings and conclusions as to these issues.

It is so ordered.

REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION

Frank E. Brown, Chairman
Thomas D. Epsky, Member
Joseph D. Finnegan, Member

This is to certify that on
12/26/2013,
the above Order was filed in the office of
the Clerk of the Reemployment
Assistance Appeals Commission, and a
copy mailed to the last known address
of each interested party.
By: Kady Thomas
Deputy Clerk



DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
Reemployment Assistance Appeals
Suite 240
215 Market Street
Jacksonville FL 32202-2850

IMPORTANT: For free translation assistance, you may call 1-800-204-2418. Please do not delay, as there is a limited time to appeal.
IMPORTANTE: Para recibir ayuda gratuita con traducciones, puede llamar al 1-800-204-2418. Por favor hágalo lo antes posible, ya que el tiempo para apelar es limitado.
ENPÒTAN: Pou yon intèpret asistè ou gratis, nou gendwa rélé 1-800-204-2418. Sil vou plè pa pràn àmpil tòn, paské tòn limité pou ou ranpli apèl la.

Docket No. 2013-39025U

Jurisdiction: §443.151(4)(a)&(b) Florida Statutes

CLAIMANT/Appellee

EMPLOYER/Appellant

APPEARANCES: CLAIMANT & EMPLOYER

LOCAL OFFICE #: 3676-0

DECISION OF APPEALS REFEREE

**Important appeal rights are explained at the end of this decision.
Derechos de apelación importantes son explicados al final de esta decisión.
Yo eksplike kèk dwa dapèl enpòtan lan fen desizyon sa a.**

Issues Involved:

SEPARATION: Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with work or voluntarily left work without good cause as defined in the statute, pursuant to Sections 443.101(1), (9), (10), (11); 443.036(30), Florida Statutes; Rule 73B-11.020, Florida Administrative Code.

CHARGES TO EMPLOYMENT RECORD: Whether benefit payments made to the claimant shall be charged to the employment record of the employer, pursuant to Sections 443.101(9); 443.131(3)(a), Florida Statutes; Rules 73B-10.026, 11.018, Florida Administrative Code. (If employer charges are not at issue on the current claim, the hearing may determine charges on a subsequent claim.)

NONAPPEARANCE: Whether there is good cause for proceeding with an additional hearing pursuant to Rules 73B-20.016; 20.017, Florida Administrative Code.

Nonappearance: A hearing was scheduled in this matter for May 1, 2013 at 8:00 a.m. The employer did not appear at the May 1 hearing because the employer's representative was called into an unexpected meeting that lasted longer than she thought it would last. The employer requested reopening on May 1, 2013.

A case will be re-opened for a hearing on the merits when a party requests a reopening within 20 days of rendition of the decision and establishes good cause for not attending a previous hearing. If good cause is not established, the previous decision will be reinstated.

The record reflects that the employer did not appear at the May 1 hearing because the employer's representative was called into an unexpected meeting that lasted longer than she thought it would last. The employer's reason for failing to appear is considered compelling. The employer exercised due diligence in requesting reopening. Therefore, the employer has established good cause for its nonappearance and is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the case.

Findings of Fact: The claimant worked for the employer as a charge entry poster from March 26, 2007 to February 1, 2013. The employer's

policy provides that employees are prohibited from accessing their own medical records and medical records of family members unless they are accessing the records in connection with regular business purposes. The claimant was aware of the employer's policy. The claimant admittedly accessed her own and her son's medical information. There were a few times she accessed the information to perform charge entries as part of her job. However, many of the times she accessed the files, no work was performed in connection with such access. The employer discharged the claimant for violation of the policy. The employer has discharged other employees in the past for the same type of policy violation.

Conclusions of Law: As of June 27, 2011, Florida Statute Section 443.036(30) defines misconduct connected with work as, but is not limited to, the following, which may not be construed in pari materia with each other:

- (a) Conduct demonstrating conscious disregard of an employer's interests and found to be a deliberate violation or disregard of the reasonable standards of behavior which the employer expects of his or her employee.
- (b) Carelessness or negligence to a degree or recurrence that manifests culpability, or wrongful intent, or shows an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to his or her employer.
- (c) Chronic absenteeism or tardiness in deliberate violation of a known policy of the employer or one or more unapproved absences following a written reprimand or warning relating to more than one unapproved absence.
- (d) A willful and deliberate violation of a standard or regulation of this state by an employee of an employer licensed or certified by this state, which violation would cause the employer to be sanctioned or have its license or certification suspended by this state.

(e) A violation of an employer's rule, unless the claimant can demonstrate that:

1. He or she did not know, and could not reasonably know, of the rules requirements;
2. The rule is not lawful or not reasonably related to the job environment and performance; or
3. The rule is not fairly or consistently enforced.


The record reflects that the claimant was discharged. The claimant knew the employer's policy and knew she was not allowed to access her medical information or her son's information. She did so regardless. The claimant violated the employer's policy and did not establish that she did not know the policy, that the policy is not lawful or not reasonably related to the job environment and performance, or that the policy is not fairly or consistently enforced. Therefore, the claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with work and is subject to disqualification.

Decision: The determination dated March 22, 2013 is reversed. The claimant is disqualified the week ended February 2, 2013, plus five weeks, and until she earns \$3,060. The employer's account (0507301) is relieved of charges for benefits paid in connection with this claim.

This is to certify that a copy of the above decision was mailed to the last known address of each interested party on June 24, 2013.

J. SHARP
Appeals Referee

By:



C. E. DE MORANVILLE, Deputy Clerk

IMPORTANT - APPEAL RIGHTS: This decision will become final unless a written request for review or reopening is filed within 20 calendar days after the mailing date shown. If the 20th day is a Saturday, Sunday or holiday defined in F.A.C. 73B-21.004, filing may be made on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or holiday. If this decision disqualifies and/or holds the claimant ineligible for benefits already received, the claimant will be required to repay those benefits. The specific amount of any overpayment will be calculated by the Department and set forth in a separate overpayment determination. However, the time to request review of

this decision is as shown below and is not stopped, delayed or extended by any other determination, decision or order.

A party who did not attend the hearing for good cause may request reopening, including the reason for not attending, at <https://iap.floridajobs.org/> or by writing to the address at the top of this decision. The date the confirmation number is generated will be the filing date of a request for reopening on the Appeals Web Site.

A party who attended the hearing and received an adverse decision may file a request for review to the Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission, Suite 101 Rhyne Building, 2740 Centerview Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4151; (Fax: 850-488-2123); <https://raaciap.floridajobs.org/>. If mailed, the postmark date will be the filing date. If faxed, hand-delivered, delivered by courier service other than the United States Postal Service, or submitted via the Internet, the date of receipt will be the filing date. To avoid delay, include the docket number and claimant's social security number. A party requesting review should specify any and all allegations of error with respect to the referee's decision, and provide factual and/or legal support for these challenges. Allegations of error not specifically set forth in the request for review may be considered waived.

IMPORTANTE - DERECHOS DE APELACIÓN: Esta decisión pasará a ser final a menos que una solicitud por escrito para revisión o reapertura se registre dentro de 20 días de calendario después de la fecha marcada en que la decisión fue remitida por correo. Si el vigésimo (20) día es un sábado, un domingo o un feriado definidos en F.A.C. 73B-21.004, el registro de la solicitud se puede realizar en el día siguiente que no sea un sábado, un domingo o un feriado. Si esta decisión descalifica y/o declara al reclamante como inelegible para recibir beneficios que ya fueron recibidos por el reclamante, se le requerirá al reclamante rembolsar esos beneficios. La cantidad específica de cualquier sobrepago [*pago excesivo de beneficios*] será calculada por la Agencia y establecida en una determinación de pago excesivo de beneficios que será emitida por separado. Sin embargo, el límite de tiempo para solicitar la revisión de esta decisión es como se establece anteriormente y dicho límite no es detenido, demorado o extendido por ninguna otra determinación, decisión u orden.

Una parte que no asistió a la audiencia por una buena causa puede solicitar una reapertura, incluyendo la razón por no haber comparecido en la audiencia, en <https://iap.floridajobs.org/> o escribiendo a la dirección en la parte superior de esta decisión. La fecha en que se genera el número de confirmación será la fecha de registro de una solicitud de reapertura realizada en el Sitio Web de la Oficina de Apelaciones.

Una parte que asistió a la audiencia y recibió una decisión adversa puede registrar una solicitud de revisión con la Comisión de Apelaciones de Desempleo; Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission, Suite 101 Rhyne Building, 2740 Centerview Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4151; (Fax: 850-488-2123); <https://raaciap.floridajobs.org/>. Si la solicitud es enviada por correo, la fecha del sello de la oficina de correos será la fecha de registro de la solicitud. Si es enviada por telefax, entregada a mano, entregada por servicio de mensajería, con la excepción del Servicio Postal de Estados Unidos, o realizada vía el Internet, la fecha en la que se recibe la solicitud será la fecha de registro. Para evitar demora, incluya el número de expediente [*docket number*] y el número de seguro social del reclamante. Una parte que solicita una revisión debe especificar cualquiera y todos los alegatos de error con respecto a la decisión del árbitro, y proporcionar fundamentos reales y/o legales para substanciar éstos desafíos. Los alegatos de error que no se establezcan con especificidad en la solicitud de revisión pueden considerarse como renunciados.

ENPÒTAN – DWA DAPÈL: Desizyon sa a ap definitiv sòf si ou depoze yon apèl nan yon delè 20 jou apre dat nou poste sa a ba ou. Si 20^{yèm} jou a se yon samdi, yon dimanch oswa yon jou konje, jan sa defini lan F.A.C. 73B-21.004, depo an kapab fèt jou aprè a, si se pa yon samdi, yon dimanch oswa yon jou konje. Si desizyon an diskalifye epi/oswa deklare moun k ap fè demann lan pa kalifye pou alokasyon li resevwa deja, moun k ap fè demann lan ap gen pou li remèt lajan li te resevwa a. Se Ajans lan k ap kalkile montan nenpòt ki peman anplis

epi y ap detèmine sa lan yon desizyon separe. Sepandan, delè pou mande revizyon desizyon sa a se delè yo bay anwo a; Okenn lòt detèminasyon, desizyon oswa lòd pa ka rete, retade oubyen pwolonje dat sa a.

Yon pati ki te gen yon rezon valab pou li pat asiste seyans lan gen dwa mande pou yo ouvri ka a ankò; fòk yo bay rezon yo pat ka vini an epi fè demann nan sou sitwèb sa a, <https://iap.floridajobs.org/> oswa alekri nan adrès ki mansyone okomansman desizyon sa a. Dat yo pwodui nimewo konfimasyon an se va dat yo prezante demann nan pou reouvri kòz la sou Sitwèb Apèl la.

Yon pati ki te asiste seyans la epi ki pat satisfè desizyon yo te pran an gen dwa mande yon revizyon nan men Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission, Suite 101 Rhyne Building, 2740 Centerview Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4151; (Fax: 850-488-2123); <https://raaciap.floridajobs.org/>. Si ou voye l pa lapòs, dat ki sou tenb la ap dat ou depoze apèl la. Si ou depoze apèl la sou yon sitwèb, ou fakse li, bay li men nan laman, oswa voye li pa yon sèvis mesajri ki pa Sèvis Lapòs Lèzetazini (*United States Postal Service*), oswa voye li pa Entènèt, dat ki sou resi a se va dat depo a. Pou evite reta, mete nimewo rejis la (*docket number*) avèk nimewo sekirite sosyal moun k ap fè demann lan. Yon pati k ap mande revizyon dwe presize nenpòt ki alegasyon erè nan kad desizyon abit la, epi bay baz reyèl oubyen legal pou apiye alegasyon sa yo. Yo p ap pran an konsiderasyon alegasyon erè ki pa byen presize nan demann pou revizyon an.

Any questions related to benefits or claim certifications should be referred to the Claims Information Center at 1-800-204-2418. An equal opportunity employer/program. Auxiliary aids and services are available upon request to individuals with disabilities. Voice telephone numbers on this document may be reached by persons using TTY/TDD equipment via the Florida Relay Service at 711.
