

**AGENCY FOR WORKFORCE INNOVATION
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA**

PETITIONER:

Employer Account No. - 1505036
SMITH CARTAGE INC
12300 NW 32ND AVE
MIAMI FL 33167-2418

RESPONDENT:

State of Florida
Agency for Workforce Innovation
c/o Department of Revenue

**PROTEST OF LIABILITY
DOCKET NO. 2010-161256L**

ORDER

This matter comes before me for final Agency Order.

Having fully considered the Special Deputy's Recommended Order and the record of the case and in the absence of any exceptions to the Recommended Order, I adopt the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth therein. A copy of the Recommended Order is attached and incorporated in this Final Order.

In consideration thereof, it is ORDERED that the determination dated October 5, 2010, is REVERSED.

DONE and ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, this _____ day of **April, 2011**.



TOM CLENDENNING
Assistant Director
AGENCY FOR WORKFORCE INNOVATION

**AGENCY FOR WORKFORCE INNOVATION
Unemployment Compensation Appeals**

MSC 345 CALDWELL BUILDING
107 EAST MADISON STREET
TALLAHASSEE FL 32399-4143

PETITIONER:

Employer Account No. - 1505036
SMITH CARTAGE INC
ATTN: JEFF FUTERNICK
12300 NW 32ND AVE
MIAMI FL 33167-2418

RESPONDENT:

State of Florida
Agency for Workforce Innovation
c/o Department of Revenue

**PROTEST OF LIABILITY
DOCKET NO. 2010-161256L**

RECOMMENDED ORDER OF SPECIAL DEPUTY

TO: Assistant Director
Agency for Workforce Innovation

This matter comes before the undersigned Special Deputy pursuant to the Petitioner’s protest of the Respondent’s determination dated October 5, 2010.

After due notice to the parties, a telephone hearing was held on January 7, 2011. The Petitioner’s vice president of operations appeared and testified at the hearing. The Joined Party appeared and testified on his own behalf. A tax specialist II appeared and testified on behalf of the Respondent.

The record of the case, including the recording of the hearing and any exhibits submitted in evidence, is herewith transmitted. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not received.

Issue:

Whether services performed for the Petitioner by the Joined Party and other individuals constitute insured employment pursuant to Sections 443.036(19), 443.036(21); 443.1216, Florida Statutes, and if so, the effective date of the liability.

Findings of Fact:

1. The Petitioner is a corporation, incorporated for the purpose of running a transportation business. The Petitioner contracts with truck owner/operators to move cargo for the Petitioner’s customers.
2. The Joined Party provided services as a truck driver to the Petitioner from February 19, 2003, through July 10, 2010.

3. The Joined Party signed an independent contractor agreement with the Petitioner at the time of hire.
4. Drivers call in or leave word of their availability. The Petitioner contacts the drivers with available work. The driver can refuse the work without penalty. The driver would be given information on where the cargo should be picked up and dropped off. The driver was free to select his own route.
5. The Joined Party was allowed to hire an assistant. The Joined Party would negotiate the pay for the assistant with the prospective assistant.
6. The Joined Party was required to provide his own truck. The Joined Party was required to provide insurance, fuel, and maintenance for the truck.
7. The Petitioner paid the Joined Party by the load. The rate of pay for each load was based on a percentage of the load value. The percentage was established by negotiation with the Joined Party.
8. The Joined Party was required to have a class A commercial driver's license, a valid medical card, and the appropriate inspection and registration papers for the vehicle.

Conclusions of Law:

9. The issue in this case, whether services performed for the Petitioner constitute employment subject to the Florida Unemployment Compensation Law, is governed by Chapter 443, Florida Statutes. Section 443.1216(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, provides that employment subject to the chapter includes service performed by individuals under the usual common law rules applicable in determining an employer-employee relationship.
10. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the term "usual common law rules" is to be used in a generic sense to mean the "standards developed by the courts through the years of adjudication." United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179 (1970).
11. The Supreme Court of Florida adopted and approved the tests in 1 Restatement of Law, Agency 2d Section 220 (1958), for use to determine if an employment relationship exists. See Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1966); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Kendall, 88 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1956); Magarian v. Southern Fruit Distributors, 1 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1941); see also Kane Furniture Corp. v. R. Miranda, 506 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
12. Restatement of Law is a publication, prepared under the auspices of the American Law Institute, which explains the meaning of the law with regard to various court rulings. The Restatement sets forth a nonexclusive list of factors that are to be considered when judging whether a relationship is an employment relationship or an independent contractor relationship.
13. 1 Restatement of Law, Agency 2d Section 220 (1958) provides:
 - (1) A servant is a person employed to perform services for another and who, in the performance of the services, is subject to the other's control or right of control.
 - (2) The following matters of fact, among others, are to be considered:
 - (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the business may exercise over the details of the work;
 - (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
 - (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;

- (d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
 - (e) whether the employer or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
 - (f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
 - (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
 - (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
 - (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant;
 - (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
14. Comments in the Restatement explain that the word “servant” does not exclusively connote manual labor, and the word “employee” has largely replaced “servant” in statutes dealing with various aspects of the working relationship between two parties. In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Department of Labor & Employment Security, 472 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) the court confirmed that the factors listed in the Restatement are the proper factors to be considered in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists. However, in citing La Grande v. B&L Services, Inc., 432 So.2d 1364, 1366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the court acknowledged that the question of whether a person is properly classified an employee or an independent contractor often cannot be answered by reference to “hard and fast” rules, but rather must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
15. The evidence presented in this hearing revealed that the Petitioner did not exercise control over the work performed by the Joined Party. The Joined Party could determine what work to accept and by what route the cargo would be delivered. The Joined Party was required to provide the equipment and materials needed to perform the work. The Joined Party was required to insure, fuel, and maintain the vehicle used in the work. The parties signed an independent contractor agreement which reflected the intentions of the party and the nature of the relationship.
16. A preponderance of the evidence presented in this case reveals that the Petitioner did not establish sufficient control over the Joined Party as to create an employer-employee relationship between the parties.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the determination dated October 5, 2010, be REVERSED.

Respectfully submitted on March 10, 2011.



KRIS LONKANI, Special Deputy
Office of Appeals